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Forecasts of the proportion of food retailing likely to be conducted over the Internet remain small, perhaps only 
contributing 2 percent of sales. One reason for this low market share is the challenge E-Grocers face in developing 
strategies which respond to four key areas of interest to consumers: signals of ﬁrm quality; signals of product quality; 
the range of products offered; and service, or customer-relationship management (CRM). Careful attention to these 
consumer concerns is important in all retail relationships–online or ofﬂine. This paper compares indicators of these 
factors across U.S. E-Grocers. A quantitative four-period ranking of online food-retailing strategies is presented for 
the nascent industry. Data from the third and fourth quarters of 2001, the fourth quarter of 2002, and the ﬁrst quarter 
of 2004 provide the basis of this discussion. After initial setbacks, data show traditional (“bricks”) grocery retailers 
successfully developing online strategies. Firms not primarily focused on groceries exited the E-Grocery sector, while 
the development of specialty food suppliers blurred the concept of online food retailing. Gaps in current strategies are 
indicated using content analyses of E-Grocery web sites. 
Socioeconomic characteristics such as growing de-
mands on consumers’ time, increased wealth, and 
heightened levels of stress in consumers’ everyday 
lives present both challenges and opportunities 
for consumer-goods ﬁrms. Bygone concepts of 
customers spending a lot of time collecting advice 
about product attributes by engaging in individual 
conversations with friends and family before se-
lecting and purchasing articles have disappeared. 
Likewise, today’s groceries are rarely bought from 
small “mom and pop” stores offering personalized 
shopping relationships. This nostalgic experience 
has been replaced by “big-box” grocery stores and 
“adventure” shopping centers. Consumers now 
desire the convenience of “one-stop shopping.” 
Accordingly, today’s grocery stores have expanded 
to offer many products other than food—in fact, 
among the leading grocers in the U.S. are ﬁrms that 
started out retailing non-food consumer goods (e.g., 
Wal-Mart). To attract customers, traditional grocery 
retailers must continue to offer more services and a 
larger range of products and varieties.
While it is still not clear how such trends in 
grocery retailing convert to an effective online 
model, the same socioeconomic factors mentioned 
above have inﬂuenced the growth of E-Commerce 
in general. Many ﬁrms moving ﬁrst to adopt E-
Grocery strategies (clicks) have found it difﬁcult 
to mirror the level of service provided by current 
store formats (bricks). The high total cost (including 
the opportunity cost of time spent) of E-Grocers’ 
“picking” and distributing items from a wide range 
of possible products and consumers learning how to 
shop online may be delaying the wider adoption of 
such E-Commerce by grocers and consumers alike. 
Such costs have also meant negative or low levels of 
proﬁtability for most E-Grocery models to date. Yet 
the success of Tesco in the U.K. and their expansion 
to the U.S. (Safeway) and Asia keeps this from be-
ing an overall indictment of E-Grocery efforts.
A dynamic evaluation of online food E-Com-
merce strategies was conducted to determine if there 
are emerging “best practices” and to better under-
stand how the nascent industry is responding to 
consumer demands. Research questions include:
•  Is there a common set of E-Commerce strate-
gies that appear to be successful?
•  How are E-Grocers communicating informa-
tion about the products and services they are 
offering?
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•  Do “bricks-and-clicks” have an advantage 
over pure-play E-Grocers?
•  How have E-Grocers evolved over time?
This comparison of E-Grocers does not attempt 
to suggest which business models are best, nor to 
measure speciﬁc ﬁnancial (or other) performance 
measures. Furthermore, although informed by such, 
this paper does not report results of consumer-sur-
vey work which highlights customer demands and 
frustrations (see Morganosky and Cude [2002] for 
an excellent illustration). Instead, a quantitative 
four-period ranking of various indicators of E-Com-
merce strategies for the U.S. E-Grocery industry 
illustrates the dynamics of this rapidly evolving 
market. This tracking focuses on those signals 
provided to online customers and is grounded in 
the theory of customer-relationship management 
and the role of quality signals in retailing. Results 
offer guidance to E-Grocers on areas needing fur-
ther strategic consideration. 
Most signiﬁcantly, the longitudinal nature of 
this research is a unique opportunity to observe 
an emerging industry. Three years of study is not 
a long time in traditional economic studies, but it 
does cover about half the lifespan of the E-Grocery 
industry. Dynamics in E-Commerce certainly oc-
cur at a different pace! This study offers what is 
essentially a real-time evolutionary study of the 
emergence of online grocery sales. It has followed 
the industry from the fallout of highly publicized 
industry failures (e.g., Webvan) to an environment 
again supportive of adopting online sales. More 
importantly, these observations enable us to track 
changes in ﬁrms’ online performance and compare 
their strategies to overall business trends in general 
retailing, E-Commerce, and the traditional grocery 
marketplace. Given the ongoing competitive 
shakeout in the overall grocery industry, this type 
of research offers the chance to observe positions 
gained or lost through the application of online 
strategies. 
Background
Forecasts of the potential share of food retailing 
likely to be conducted over the Internet in the com-
ing years tend to be small, an estimated 2 percent 
of total food sales. Data from a 2003 Food Manu-
facturing Institute survey suggested as many as 3 
percent of shoppers have experimented with online 
grocery purchasing. Results of a recent Michigan 
State University study published in Internet Re-
tailer (2004) reported “2003 online sales of food 
and beverages [was] estimated at $3.7 billion, up 
40% from $2.64 billion in 2002.” By the end of 
2005, Jupiter Research expects E-Grocery sales to 
reach $3.3 billion nationwide. Regardless of which 
numbers you believe, consensus appears to be that 
this sector is continuing to grow.
One reason for the slow adoption of online food 
shopping may be the inherent inability of grocers 
and others marketing food directly to consumers 
online to develop tactics that address the uniqueness 
of the relationships between consumers, producers 
and retailers and the key role of product strategies. 
Perishable (fresh and frozen) items drive many of 
the decisions consumers make regarding where they 
shop—product quality is particularly important in 
this retail market segment. This presents a challenge 
for E-Grocers attempting to signal product qual-
ity and manage an effective distribution strategy 
(Hooker, Heilig, and Ernst 2001). Meat, poultry, 
seafood, produce, and other items depend on or-
ganoleptic (touch, smell, sight) experiences to guide 
selection during pre-purchase search. This process 
does not yet transfer well online. Such a failure of 
these “gateway” products to generate sales online 
may limit the growth of E-Grocery shopping to 
lower-value bulky items with more stable and/or 
more easily communicated quality attributes. These 
center-of-store nationally branded items generally 
carry a lower margin for retailers compared to pro-
duce, bakery, and delicatessen departments. This 
suggests that how an E-Grocer signals product 
quality is worthy of analysis.
Other signals of the overall reputation or qual-
ity of the ﬁrm itself may prove just as important to 
the success of E-Grocers. As discussed in Rha et 
al. (2001, p.8), E-Grocers are selling “experience 
goods” and, as such, models of the economics of 
information and ﬁrm/reputation signaling are ap-
propriate when evaluating their business strategies. 
The novelty of purchasing food online also makes 
the E-Grocery itself an experience service, magnify-
ing the importance of the ﬁrm’s ability to signal its 
own quality to potential customers. This infers that 
how well the ﬁrm presents itself as a reliable sup-
plier may be just as important as how the E-Grocer 
signals the quality of its foods. 
Given the limited experience with online food 
shopping, E-Grocers must constantly evaluate the 
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their services and determine how to attract these 
consumers as quickly as possible. Although the sup-
ply of items to purchase on the Internet is diverse 
and online ordering can constitute an advantage for 
time-constrained consumers after an initial learning 
period, the question remains whether (and what type 
of) customers will adopt online grocery ordering. 
What tools are E-Grocers using to ease this adoption 
process and to mitigate reluctant consumers’ con-
cerns? Morganosky and Cude (2000, p. 24) found, 
for example, that many respondents of their sur-
vey were apprehensive about the security of online 
transactions. Bielski (2000) discussed many differ-
ent ways of making online payments, e.g., e-cash, to 
make secure nonrepudiatable non-credit-card pay-
ments efﬁciently. Given these observations and the 
recent business failures in the general E-Commerce 
sector due to insufﬁcient customer depth, tools that 
enhance response to customer demands are essential 
(see Rha, Hooker, and Widdows [2003] for more 
detail on such CRM tools).
Marketplaces which facilitate procurement by 
linking many buyers and suppliers electronically 
have advantages for both sets of agents. Buyers get 
easier access to product information, convenient 
purchase of associated services, and, sometimes, 
the ability to pool volume; suppliers gain access to 
wider markets. Indeed, these beneﬁts have driven 
the business-to-business side of E-Commerce and 
provide incentives for those looking to break into 
the consumer-direct market. From an industry-struc-
ture standpoint, the attractiveness of digital market-
places varies depending on the products involved. 
The most important determinant of a marketplace’s 
proﬁt potential is the intrinsic power of the buyers 
and sellers in the particular market area. If either 
side is concentrated or possesses differentiated 
products, it will gain bargaining power over the 
marketplace and capture most of the value generated 
(Porter 2001). For instance, consumers shopping 
at a large physical supermarket can choose from 
a total product mix that may exceed 30,000 stock 
keeping units (SKU) and includes a huge variety of 
fresh foods. This underscores the value of product 
range in the grocery market. Despite its eventual 
failure, Webvan represented a breakthrough in this 
area among online grocers. The business model 
provided customers with upwards of 50,000 SKUs 
(food and non-food items) from which to choose, 
almost certainly the largest assortment of any E-
Grocer (Ring and Tigert 2001). Other E-Grocers 
have limited their offerings, choosing to focus on a 
specialty area. Finding the optimal level of products 
from both a consumer-demand position and an op-
erational-efﬁciency perspective remains a challenge 
for remaining marketers in the E-Grocery space. A 
range of such strategies are compared below.
Methodology
To assess E-Grocery strategies, a detailed quan-
titative E-Commerce content-analysis tool was 
constructed and applied to industry web sites. This 
accounted for a set of 30 operations in the third 
quarter of 2001, 29 for the fourth quarter of 2001, 
20 sites in the fourth quarter of 2002, and 23 in the 
ﬁrst quarter 2004 (Tables 1–4). Comparable data 
sets from four points in time make it possible to 
track changing E-Commerce strategies. Keep in 
mind that this industry is operating on “Internet 
time”—the compressed speed at which business 
practices change and with which success or fail-
ure is determined in an online industry adjusts our 
traditional terms of evaluation signiﬁcantly. The 
period assessed provides interesting lessons in 
industry dynamics.
Approximately 370 indicators were reviewed for 
each E-Grocer in each period. Each of the indica-
tors was grouped into one of the four factors; ﬁrm 
quality, product quality, CRM, or product range. 
The initial evaluation tool was developed with input 
from a group of E-Agribusiness researchers familiar 
with a previous qualitative tool used to assess E-
Grocery sites (Rha et al. 2001). The researchers con-
sulted relevant academic and industry literature in 
the ﬁelds of marketing, communication, computer 
science, and consumer science in selecting indica-
tors which quantify both the technical performance 
of a web site and its success or failure as a market-
ing-communication and sales-transaction tool. This 
E-Grocery content-analysis tool includes market-
ing strategies that are emerging in the traditional 
food-retailing environment to determine if these 
are transitioning successfully online. For example, 
do E-Grocers provide product-label information 
such as “Nutrition Facts” to facilitate comparisons 
between brands? Do product search engines exist 
which sort organic products from conventional? 
Does the E-Grocer disclose country-of-origin in-
formation for produce items? To accommodate and 
track the application of these issues, the research 
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Table 1. Ranking Over Key Categories and Overall (3rd Quarter 2001).
E-Grocer  Firm-quality  CRM sum  Product-quality  Range sum  Total
  sum    sum
1 Marsh 63.5 27.5 28.5 78.5 198
2 Harris Teeter 60 27 40.5 66.5 194
3 Giant Food 61 33 37.5 61.5 193
4 Albertsons 40.5 37.5 38 64.5 180.5
5 Stop & Shop 59.5 35 25.5 60.5 180.5
6 Bashas 71 26.5 24 56 177.5
7 Peapod 59 34.5 37.5 45.5 176.5
8 Schnucks 43 29 31.5 70.5 174
9 Hy-Vee 62.5 27.5 31.5 49 170.5
10 Ingles Markets 49.5 30.5 17 61.5 158.5
11 Why Run Out 45 30 15.5 61 151.5
12 Stater Bros 49 26.5 13.5 62 151
13 Easy Grocer 49.5 26 19.5 50.5 145.5
14 Publix 46 28.5 22.5 48.5 145.5
15 Walgreens 41.5 32 29.5 38 141
16 Simon Delivers 40 24 25.5 50 139.5
17 My Web Grocer 35 27 15.5 55.5 133
18 Market One Stop 36.5 30 7.5 50.5 124.5
19 House Calls Online 41.5 25 6.5 45 118
20 Price Chopper 63 21 19 14 117
21 Net Grocer 30 26.5 16.5 42.5 115.5
22 Ethnic Grocer 27 36 27.5 21 111.5
23 Grocer Online 22.5 28 24.5 35.5 110.5
24 Kroger 45 25 23.5 12 105.5
25 Metro Food Market 41.5 20 23 15.5 100
26 Electric Food 25.5 25 27.5 22 100
27 Your Grocer 34.5 27 4 30.5 96
28 Groceries Express 36.5 22 11 26 95.5
29 Bluelight 34 29.5 4 26.5 94
30 Giant 36 28 7.5 6.5 78
             
  Avg 45.0 28.2 21.8 44.2 139.2
  Max 71.0 37.5 40.5 78.5 198.0
  Min 22.5 20.0 4.0 6.5 78.0
  Max Possible 112 48 95 131 386.070   July 2004 Journal of Food Distribution Research 35(2)









1 Giant Food 55.5 36 41 60 192.5
2 Marsh 68 26 26.5 60.5 181
3 Albertsons 43 29 19.5 80 171.5
4 Harris Teeter 56.5 28.5 35.5 50.5 171
5 Stop & Shop 52 34 18.5 62 166.5
6 Peapod 62.5 33 24.5 43.5 163.5
7 Bashas 63.5 22.5 22 52 160
8 Schnucks 45.5 27.5 27.5 54.5 155
9 Simon Delivers 40 24 26.5 60 150.5
10 Hy-Vee 49.5 29 23.5 47.5 149.5
11 Publix 38 31 30.5 48.5 148
12 Stater Bros 33.5 33 11.5 61.5 139.5
13 Net Grocer 35.5 27 30.5 37 130
14 Why Run Out 22.5 33 13 61.5 130
15 Walgreens 52.5 33.5 15.5 26 127.5
16 House Calls Online 40 29 19 39 127
17 My Web Grocer 32.5 26.5 12.5 54 125.5
18 Easy Grocer 31.5 21.5 22.5 49 124.5
19 Ingles Markets 39.5 20 12.5 49 121
20 Market One Stop 33.5 29.5 5.5 51 119.5
21 Ethnic Grocer 28.5 35.5 24 20 108
22 Price Chopper 47.5 14.5 14 19 95
23 Electric Food 19.5 30.5 18.5 21.5 90
24 Kroger 37.5 22.5 16.5 12.5 89
25 Grocery-Stork 30.5 17.5 27.5 11 86.5
26 Giant 38.5 25.5 14 7 85
27 Bluelight 37 26 2.5 17 82.5
28 Metro Food Market 35 14.5 22 7.5 79
29 Groceries Express 31.5 20.5 8.5 18 78.5
             
  Avg 41.4 26.9 20.2 40.7 129.2
  Max 68.0 36.0 41.0 80.0 192.5
  Min 19.5 14.5 2.5 7.0 78.5
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selected. This approach results in a comprehensive 
E-Commerce evaluation tool, as can be seen from 
the example indicators presented in the Appendix.
The E-Grocery content-analysis tool spanned 
signals about the ﬁrm and signals about the products 
offered. Information collected included return poli-
cies, delivery options, pricing strategies, payment 
options, the use of feedback forms and other CRM 
tools, security issues, the use of customer proﬁles, 
measures of the ease of use of the web site, and 
coordination strategies for traditional grocery store 
format and E-Commerce operations, or bricks-and-
clicks overlaps. Product signals included nutritional 
information made available on the web site, back-
ground on agricultural-production practices, reci-
pes, the range of products offered (including the 
brands for sale), and the use of “meal solution” or 
bundling strategies for food and non-food items.
An E-Commerce content-analysis approach, 
as applied here, essentially records instances of 
speciﬁc text, information, or tools occurring on a 
web site (Park and Stoel 2002). Content analyses 
provide a true customer-facing description of the E-
Grocers marketing-communication strategy. Pres-









1 Giant Food 71.5 26.5 36.5 56 190.5
2 Stop & Shop 63 30 24.5 50.5 168
3 Peapod 51 34 29.5 52 166.5
4 Marsh 53.5 28 18 62.5 162
5 Schnucks 58 29 18 54.5 159.5
6 Bashas 60 22.5 15 55.5 153
7 Simon Delivers 44.5 27.5 27 54 153
8 Harris Teeter 40.5 26.5 22.5 60 149.5
9 Hy-Vee 51 26.5 23 47.5 148
10 Albertsons 43.5 31.5 15.5 57.5 148
11 Publix 39.5 25.5 27 46 138
12 Net Grocer 13 27 32.5 40 112.5
13 Stater Bros 38 28 2 39.5 107.5
14 Walgreens 46.5 28 15 18 107.5
15 Why Run Out 28 31 2 39.5 100.5
16 Ethnic Grocer 19.5 26.5 12 25.5 83.5
17 Price Chopper 40 13.5 10 9 72.5
18 Groceries Express 33 22.5 10 2.5 68
19 Metro Food Market 42 7.5 15 1 65.5
20 Giant 33.5 5.5 13 1 53
             
  Avg 43.5 24.9 18.4 38.6 125.3
  Max 71.5 34 36.5 62.5 190.5
  Min 13.0 5.5 2.0 1.0 53.0
  Max Possible 112 48 95 131 386.072   July 2004 Journal of Food Distribution Research 35(2)
ence or absence of indicators was recorded along 
with numerical (count) measures for key variables 
such as the number of food products available in 
a certain category. The tool was applied by one 
researcher each period to remove the potential of 
multiple reporter bias. Each E-Grocer’s web site 
took between three and six hours to evaluate. A mix 
of pure-play (online-only) E-Grocers and bricks-
and-clicks (online plus physical stores) operations 
were evaluated each period.
Our deﬁnition of an E-Grocer informed the se-
lection of web sites to evaluate: an E-Commerce 
operation which allows consumers to order a full 
range of food products, both perishable and non-
perishable, for delivery or pickup. Specialized 
food E-Commerce sites (e.g., sellers concentrating 









1 Lowes Foods 53.5 33.5 24.5 79 190.5
2 Stop & shop 67 34 34.5 44.5 180
3 Peapod 51 34 34.5 52 171.5
4 Albertsons 51 34 24.5 59.5 169
5 Vons 56.5 29 31 51.5 168
6 Pavilions 56.5 29 31 51.5 168
7 Harris Teeter 49.5 28.5 26 62 166
8 Bashas 65 18.5 15 55 153.5
9 Schnucks 52 26.5 20 46 144.5
10 Giant 67 34 34.5 8.5 144
11 Simon Delivers 40 27.5 27 44 138.5
12 Sams Club 53 26 2 38 119
13 Stater Bros (Why Run Out) 29 21 9 51 110
14 Net Grocer 14 27 19 31.5 91.5
15 Your Grocer 27.5 26 2 31.5 87
16 Ethnic Grocer 19.5 29.5 18 16.5 83.5
17 Groceries Express 28.5 18.5 2 16 65
18 EGrocer 24 31 5 3 63
19 We Go Shop 42.5 15 0 0 57.5
20 Jerrys Foods 19 2 14 15 50
21 Grocery Wagon 25 17.5 0 0 42.5
22 Pinkdot 26 4 0 9 39
23 Bagboyz 26 13 0 0 39
             
  Avg 41.0 24.3 16.2 33.3 114.8
  Max 67.0 34.0 34.5 79.0 190.5
  Min 14.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 39.0
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on single products such as tea or coffee) were ex-
cluded from this analysis. Various industry reports 
were searched prior to each deployment to identify 
all signiﬁcant E-Grocers operating in the market. 
These sources included; Supermarket News Top 
75 (http://www.supermarketnews.com), Top 100 
(Internet) Retailers’ (http://www.stores.org), http:
//www.gmabrands.com, http://www.fmi.org, and 
http://foodindustrycenter.umn.edu/. These sources 
reported major bricks-and-clicks and pure-play 
grocery sites. 
For each of the simple indicators, scores of 0 
(absence), 1 (presence), or ½ (uncertain) were 
assigned. Uncertainty was deemed important as 
an indication of potential lack of clarity in online 
presentation methods. For more complex indicators 
such as the number of products available in a par-
ticular category, ranges were established based on 
the observed data. E-Grocers offering signiﬁcantly 
more items than the average number were assigned 
a score of 1, those close to the average ½, and those 
ﬁrms offering signiﬁcantly fewer items than average 
in a particular category were assigned a 0 for that 
particular item. Each indicator was then assigned 
an importance criteria (weight) ranging from –3 
to +3 in integer values1. Each indicator score was 
multiplied by the assigned weight to achieve an end-
variable score. End-variable scores were summed 
for each of the four factors—ﬁrm quality, product 
quality, CRM, and product range. In this way each 
E-Grocer can be described using a numerical score 
for each of the four factors. The ﬁnal step in this 
process required the construction of a simple sum 
over the four factors. This allowed the creation of 
rankings for E-Grocers for each period (Tables 1–4), 
along with a comparison of the strengths and weak-
nesses within and between the factors for each ﬁrm. 
The maximum scores possible in each of the four 
factors are also included in the tables.
Over the four factors, several key indicators re-
ceived particular attention and were allocated high 
weights (3 or -3, see Appendix). The presence/
absence of these key indicators played an important 
role in the resulting factor totals. For the signals of 
ﬁrm quality key indicators included the clarity of 
presentation of the E-Grocer’s return policy, privacy 
policy, and money-back guarantees; the ability to 
use coupons and loyalty (frequent-shopper) cards 
when purchasing online; the range of payment op-
tions offered; and ties to stores (bricks-and-clicks). 
Key indicators for product quality were the provi-
sion of nutritional advice and information in the 
“Nutrition Facts” (NLEA) format and the availabil-
ity and certiﬁcation of detailed product descriptions, 
particularly those for production attributes such as 
genetically modiﬁed (GM)-free, organic, or en-
hanced animal welfare.
As previously discussed in Rha et al. (2001), 
communications with consumers are of great 
importance to E-Grocers. Key indicators of a cus-
tomer-centered (CRM) focus include providing con-
sumers ways to communicate with the ﬁrm within 
a few clicks (e.g., online feedback forms, e-mail 
addresses, and dedicated CRM phone numbers). 
Tools to build “community,” such as consumer rat-
ings and recommendations, provide evidence that 
the ﬁrm recognizes the power of word-of-mouth or 
viral marketing. Ease-of-search indicators received 
a heavy weighting in the ranking process for cus-
tomer-retention and -attraction reasons. 
Key indicators in the ﬁnal factor, product range, 
included actual counts for representative products in 
various categories and the availability of foods for 
special dietary needs (e.g., allergies, diabetic/low 
sodium, and children’s meals). Examples of creative 
bundling of food and non-food items were also as-
signed a high weight in this factor.
Findings
A changing set of E-Grocers were evaluated, scored 
and ranked in each of the four periods (Tables 1–4). 
Clearly the industry has a long way to go, with few 
operations scoring even 50 percent of the maximum 
possible (either in a factor or in aggregate). While 
the research team did not expect any single ﬁrm 
to offer all aspects evaluated by the E-Grocery 
content-analysis tool, the low scores are interest-
ing and suggestive of the need for further focus 
and development that a typical operation should 
consider. By ﬁrst considering the simple statistics 
we see a reduction in absolute performance within 
the industry as reported by the declining average 
total score and increasing distribution (Max-Min). 
Average scores for each of the four factors have also 
declined over the four periods, suggesting the in-
dustry is not enhancing E-Commerce strategies—at 
least those indicators assessed by the E-Grocery 
content-analysis tool. This said, there are stand-out 
  1 This weight was based on earlier reported ﬁndings, the 
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ﬁrms which, either through higher product-range 
scores (Albertsons and Vons/Pavilions), CRM 
(Ahold ﬁrms, see below), or overall above-aver-
age performance (Simon Delivers), have improved 
their relative and absolute scores. 
In each period, both bricks-and-clicks and 
pure-play E-Grocers are present in the Top 10 list, 
although such a distinction has become increasingly 
blurred in most recent observations as Peapod more 
closely aligned with Royal Ahold stores and other 
pure-plays exited. Indeed, it is especially interesting 
to note the presence of four E-Grocers operated by 
Royal Ahold’s U.S.-based unit. Ahold USA owns 
Giant-Landover (Giant Food), Giant-Carlisle (Gi-
ant), Peapod, and Stop & Shop. While a degree of 
consistency has been attempted across these four 
Ahold brands2, differences still remain. An expla-
nation perhaps follows the range of initial business 
models of the “brick” chains involved (especially in 
the case of Giant). The presence of three of the four 
Ahold ﬁrms with similar scores in 2004 (Table 4) is 
one indication of the emerging trend toward closely 
coordinated bricks-and-clicks ﬁrms often relying on 
turnkey solutions hosted or provided by external 
ﬁrms over individual pure-play E-Grocers. Such 
ﬁrms gain advantage by spreading their technical 
infrastructure and core strategies across all entries 
owned by the parent company while capitalizing on 
the names and market space owned by the individual 
(brick) brands. Another more-recently evaluated ex-
ample is Vons and Pavilions—Safeway shares this 
format across each of its store brands.
By observing this industry through a period of 
shakeout and, more recently, additional expansion, 
we have started to see some maturation and possible 
success models for such ventures. At the end of 2001 
a limited number of pure-plays appeared to lead the 
industry, with only moderate enthusiasm on the part 
of “bricks” toward entering the online arena. By the 
ﬁrst quarter of 2004, no true pure-play ranked in our 
Top 10. This trend is in line with renewed interest 
in this sector—“bricks” appear to be strategically 
using online sales to extend their service capabilities 
and can do so by further capitalizing on their exist-
ing infrastructure (store picking versus a centralized 
warehouse-logistics system).
Further examination of the ﬁrms evaluated across 
the four observations illustrates two other grocery 
retail trends worth mentioning. Walgreens.com (a 
drug store chain) and Bluelight.com (general re-
tailer Kmart) are examples of non-traditional ﬁrms 
moving into the grocery space.3 Their E-Commerce 
strategies had varying degrees of success in 2001 
prior to exit. Several other major players in these 
two categories (Wal-Mart and CVS Pharmacy) are 
also “in the grocery business” but have not yet 
moved these products to their online stores. Given 
the exit of Walgreens from our evaluation, there is 
little to encourage CVS from entering this space 
online even as they expand their in-store food 
sales—limited food-product lines and higher costs 
of handling those products would seem to constrain 
their enthusiasm. The absence of the nation’s two 
largest food retailers, Wal-Mart and Kroger, should 
be especially noted, and is worthy of further inves-
tigation.
It is interesting to look more closely at certain 
E-Grocers that exited the business over the course of 
our study: Housecallsonline.com, Yourgrocer.com, 
Publix and Marsh. In the third-quarter 2001 
evaluation (Table 1), Housecallsonline.com and 
Yourgrocer.com both scored very low in product 
quality. On the other hand, the ﬁrm quality and 
CRM scores for these operations were acceptable,m 
close to the average of all E-Grocers. Their demise 
contradicts the assumptions of our research team 
and other analysts that managing customer rela-
tions is critical—possibly even paramount—to ﬁrm 
survival in service or quality-oriented E-Commerce. 
At the same time, we recognize that there must be 
a threshold level of products and product quality 
established before an E-Grocer thinks about build-
ing out the CRM factors. Likewise, there are ﬁrm-
structure and ﬁnancing variables not evaluated by 
our study that may have played a role in these ﬁrms’ 
exit. Publix similarly highlights a dilemma with the 
results reported here. The E-Grocery content-analy-
sis tool simply reports indicators of customer-facing 
E-Commerce strategies. Once again, even the best 
E-Grocery operation will fail if there is insufﬁcient 
consumer demand or if the business model (e.g., 
logistics system) is not proﬁtable. Marsh, on the 
other hand, was in the top rankings in the ﬁrst two 
analyses, dropped in ranking in Q4-2002, and was    2 An extreme example is Giant Food, which was not 
independently assessed in 2004 (Table 4), as Peapod now 
offers all ordering and fulﬁllment services. Prior to 2004 a 
separate web page, including online ordering, was managed 
by Giant Food.
  3 Note that observations on Bluelight.com in 2001 came 
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out of the survey pool by 2004. Marsh still exists 
online, but did not offer a wide enough range of 
products to be evaluated in 2004. The reason for 
this is unclear. 
Another interesting point over the course of the 
study is indicative of a general trend in the grocery 
business. While ﬁrms that are not primarily focused 
on groceries (Walgreens, Kmart) exited the E-Gro-
cery sector, there has been a greater emergence of 
specialty focused E-Grocers. This created two basic 
challenges for this research:
(1) When is a ﬁrm an E-Grocer and when is it 
merely one of a growing number of “shopping ser-
vices” that offer online order forms? Our decision in 
deﬁning a shopping service focused on the range of 
groceries offered and the point of fulﬁllment for the 
order. This area may lend itself to further research, 
guided by what we learned evaluating ﬁrms such 
as Pinkdot.com and Bagboyz.com that barely cross 
our threshold of deﬁnition as an E-Grocer. 
(2) When is a ﬁrm an E-Grocer and when is it an 
online supplier of a specialty food or food category? 
In the case of the latter, we screened for product 
range; operations offering a limited list of products 
were not evaluated in this study. 
Future research should more fully consider 
these two questions and the approaches selected in 
answering them used in this study. Firms such as 
Ethnicgrocer.com and Jerrysfood.com are worthy 
of further analysis. Both offer full lines of prod-
ucts, albeit below the average of all ﬁrms in this 
study. They do so, however, with a specialty twist. 
Ethnicgrocer.com offers a range of foods aimed at 
ethnic cuisines which may not be easy to ﬁnd in all 
communities. Jerrysfood.com offers a special ser-
vice based on its unique location on Sanibel Island, 
FL, catering to condominium owners and renters by 
providing a bonded delivery and stocking service 
prior to weekend arrival. These market niches are 
examples of overarching demographic and grocery 
retail trends: the need to provide special services to 
an increasingly afﬂuent but time-starved customer, 
and the inﬂuence of growing demographic diversity 
on food retailing. These trends have already affected 
in-store stocking, service, and promotion. Now we 
see them moving online. How they will fare in our 
future E-Grocery evaluations remains to be seen. 
Such specialty ﬁrms are often at a disadvantage in 
product-depth ratings but may have an opportunity 
to differentiate themselves through uniqueness, 
quality and service.
Conclusion
This paper presents a developing data set collected 
with a quantitative E-Commerce content-analysis 
tool applied to the nascent U.S. E-Grocery industry 
and illustrates considerable room for improvement 
in ﬁrms’ approaches to online retailing. Our repeated 
assessment provides the opportunity to see changes 
in this rapidly evolving industry and makes it pos-
sible to track improvements, degradations, timing, 
and possible reasons why ﬁrms enter or exit this 
business. It also can be used to benchmark busi-
nesses to industry standards, illustrating the need for 
constant reﬁnement of the methodology. To avoid 
inconsistencies from evaluation point to evaluation 
point, weighting schemes need further validation 
from consumer surveys. Additional validation 
should compare E-Grocers’ stated strategies to those 
observed by content analysis. Given the attention 
placed on CRM solutions by the industry, future re-
search using this methodology also should evaluate 
the ability to transfer traditional grocery customer-
centered tools (e.g., frequent-shopper or loyalty 
programs) online and look for any unique CRM 
applications for the E-Grocery industry. Admittedly, 
this analysis is limited to a comparison of the visible 
E-Commerce strategies adopted, and should not be 
extended to comparisons of resulting ﬁrm and/or 
business-model performance measures (e.g., ﬁrm 
valuation or proﬁtability). Likewise, the activities 
of Royal Ahold, Tesco (England), and others operat-
ing on several continents present opportunities for 
comparisons of food E-Commerce strategies based 
in cross-cultural research techniques. This interna-
tional line of research has domestic implications 
with the emergence of immigrant-driven specialty 
grocers in both the traditional food retailing and 
E-Commerce environments. Such retailers are 
catering to recent immigrants and others who have 
developed a taste for a particular cuisine.
Market analysts have doubted the role of online 
food retailing mainly because of the uncertainly of 
consumer adoption. The unique nature of grocery 
products (e.g., perishability) differentiates grocery 
retailers’ business models from others selling books 
or computers. Moreover, it has been argued that 
grocery customers are price sensitive and would 
not be likely to pay additional service fees for their 
routine grocery shopping. Whether based on sales or 
on ﬁnancial or customer-adoption metrics, few cur-
rent E-Grocers are yet successful. However, there 76   July 2004 Journal of Food Distribution Research 35(2)
is growing optimism in the industry as consumers 
seem to be willing to pay $5 or higher service fees 
to save time and effort—especially households with 
children and single male consumers who do not 
like shopping for groceries. The current success and 
growth in the number of regional markets served by 
ﬁrms such as the Royal Ahold store brands (with 
Peapod), Safeway and Albertsons reﬂects increas-
ing demand and adoption of consumers for online 
food shopping. Success stories (e.g., Tesco.com) 
are still rare, but much can be learned by examin-
ing evolving strategies and emerging performance. 
By applying the ﬁndings of this study to strategies 
linked to our four factors and implementing effec-
tive business models, online food retailers can ﬁnd 
promising market opportunities.
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